Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration by Gordon, James D., III
Cornell Law Review
Volume 75
Issue 5 July 1990 Article 1
Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration
James D. Gordon III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
James D. Gordon III, Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 986 (1990)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss5/1
A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE DOCTRINE
OF CONSIDERATION
James D. Gordon IIt
Great scholars' have long contemplated the doctrine of consid-
eration in contract law. 2 Come with me, if you will, 3 to a lawyer's
office, where a conversation between the lawyer and a client is about
to take place.4 The lawyer is Robert Lichten (L), and the client is
t Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. B.A. 1977, Brigham
Young University; J.D. 1980, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berke-
ley. I wanted to thank several famous law professors who commented on this article in
order to persuade lawreview editors that the article is really good, or in any event that I
have several famous law professor friends and am probably pretty famous myself. Un-
fortunately, the famous people I contacted told me they were too busy to read the arti-
cle, not counting one person who read it and threatened to sue me if I mentioned his
name anywhere in the article, or anytime during my entire life, for that matter. But here
is the article anyway, with apologies to Pat Bagley, Jae R. Ballif, Dave Barry, George
Carlin, Johnny Carson, the Congress of Wonders, Craig Griffin, Brian C. Johnson, Mel
Lazarus, Tom Lehrer, Jay Leno, Hans A. Linde, Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Bud Scruggs, Mark
Twain, and others.
1 Id. However, it is humbling for me to realize that by the time Stephen Crane was
my age, he had been dead for six years.
2 And no wonder. Consideration is to contract law as Elvis is to rock-and-roll: the
King. Revisionists, however, have questioned Elvis's greatness. They have wrestled
with one disturbing issue: if Elvis is so great, how come he's buried in his own back-
yard-like a hamster. They address the question openly, knowing that it is legally im-
possible to slander a dead hamster.
s Alfred Hitchcock and Rod Serling used this phrase when they were about to in-
troduce you to a nightmare.
4 Law review articles in conversational style are in, and I certainly do not want to
be left out. The best known is Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. Rxv. 1 (1984), an abstruse dialogue about critical legal studies that sounds "like
a pair of old acid-heads chewing over a passage in Sartre." David Luban, Legal Modern-
ism, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1656, 1671 (1986).
Actually, I don't know much about acid-heads. I attended BYU as an undergradu-
ate. By the time I arrived at Berkeley in the late 70s, drugs were becoming pass6, mostly
because students could see ex-flower children from the 60s still wandering around
Berkeley with vacant stares like those people in old pioneer photographs. While a few of
my classmates still believed in "Better Living through Chemistry" (and a few had a slight
dependency problem involving catnip), most of us were more "into" being laid-back,
natural, and holistic, and getting in touch with our feelings. We learned that "the body
is an entity." We didn't know what that meant, but it gave us a feeling of wholeness,
which was one of the feelings we were busy trying to get in touch with. We ate stone
ground bread. The primary advantage of stone ground bread is that it tastes better than
oat bran. Of course, dirt tastes better than oat bran, too. But dirt wasn't organic
enough.
The official student health manual encouraged people not to wear underarm deo-
dorant. It said something like, "Put some on. How does your body feel? Does your
body like that?" I am not making this up. Consequently, some of our classes were pow-
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Carla Marchant (M),5 the president of Slater Valley Coal Company.
The camera zooms in, and the volume increases until we can hear
what they are saying.
L: How can I help you today?6
M: My company has a contract to sell as much coal to Barton
Steel Company 7 as it requires. The market price of coal has risen,
so I asked Barton whether it would be willing to increase the con-
tract price, and it agreed. I need you to draft the amendment. Here
is the original contract.
L: (After reading it for a few minutes.)8 This contract is not
enforceable.
M: What? Why not?
L: It provides that Barton can terminate at any time without
notice. This is called an unrestricted termination clause, and it
means that there is no consideration for your promises in the
contract.9
M: What's consideration?
L: There are many definitions of consideration, but basically
it's a performance or return promise which is bargained for.' 0
There must be consideration for your promises to make them le-
gally binding. Although Barton made lots of promises in the con-
tract, it can terminate at any time. This is called the "illusory
promise" situation." Since Barton's promises are unenforceable,
they cannot serve as consideration for your promises. Therefore,
you are entitled to walk away from the contract.
M: We don't want to walk away from it. We want to modify it,
and Barton agreed.
erful enough to knock over large rodents at 200 yards. Or at least make their eyes water.
Of course, this all changed when interviewing season began. We could figure some
things out for ourselves.
5 Notice how the capital letters also stand for lawyer (L), and merchant (M). No-
tice also the clever play between "Marchant" and "merchant." Bonus points are
awarded for recognizing that "Carla" and "client" both start with "C." This fascinating
skill is related to the ability law professors have of writing those absolutely hilarious final
exams that just slay students and send them into paroxysms of hysterical laughter. Law
professors learn how to write those witty exams at an AALS seminar for new professors,
"How to Make Up for Your Humorless Teaching Style on the Final Exam."
6 Thereby setting the billing meter running. Twenty-five hundred billable hours,
here I come!
7 I would point out that the seller's name begins with "S" and the buyer's name
begins with "B," but you probably saw that already and are sick of my pointing out the
incredibly obvious. The merely obvious will do.
8 Moving his lips only slightly.
9 JOHN CALAMARI &JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 229 (3d ed. 1987).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979).
11 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 228-32.
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L: But the contract is unenforceable. Basically, you didn't get
anything of value out of the deal.
M: Lawyers are so arrogant. 12 Do you think that we spent
hours negotiating the deal and thousands of dollars in legal fees' 3
drafting it just for fun? We got precisely what we wanted out of this
deal, and the value we received justified our making a commitment
to sell coal to Barton. It had commercial utility to us; otherwise we
would not have done it.
L: What were you bargaining for?
M: We were bargaining for a business relationship, 14 the
chance to sell coal to Barton. 15 Barton will probably buy an enor-
mous amount of coal from us; it will probably not terminate. That's
worth a lot-to us, anyway.
L: But it's invalid consideration. 16 Barton's promise is illusory.
M: You must learn to stop being so condescending. 17 Do you
think we're fools? 18 That we can't read?19 We knew that we agreed
to a termination clause. We were willing to live with that; we were
still willing to commit ourselves to the bargain. 20
L: Not every bargained-for thing counts as consideration. 21
12 However, it is unfair to judge the entire profession by five or six hundred thou-
sand bad apples.
13 See supra note 6.
14 Cf. Stewart Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Rv. 465, 468:
[Academic contract theories] rest on worlds of discrete transactions
where people respond to calculations of short-term advantange. How-
ever, people engaged in business often find that they do not need con-
tract planning and contract law because of relational sanctions. There
are effective private governments and social fields, affected but seldom
controlled by the formal legal system. Even discrete transactions take
place within a setting of continuing relationships and interdependence.
The value of these relationships means that all involved must work to
satisfy each other. Potential disputes are suppressed, ignored, or com-
promised in the service of keeping the relationship alive.
15 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 31 (1981).
16 "Invalid consideration" is an oxymoron, like legal ethics, marital bliss, military
intelligence, family vacation, civil war, postal service, scholar athlete, Amtrak schedule,
interesting professor, and Justice [insert the name of your least favorite Supreme Court
justice here]. See D. ROBERT WHrrE, WHrrE's LAw DICIONARY 62 (1985).
17 "Condescending" means when you talk down to people.
18 Le., qualified only to get jobs sucking dents out of ping pong balls, or as proof-
readers in an M & M factory?
19 Marchant is only 39 but reads at the level of a 45-year-old.
20 The rule that illusory promises are not consideration cannot be explained on the
ground that the illusory promise is not bargained for, or is not the requested exchange
for the other's promise. That such promises "are frequently so requested with intent to
make a bargain cannot successfully be disputed. A contractor or seller is often so eager
to obtain work, or a sale, that he will gladly subject himself to an absolute promise in
return for one which leaves performance optional with the other party." SAMUEL WIL-
LISroN, WILLISTON oN CoNRAcrs 337 (rev. ed. 1936).
21 E.g., I drive a 1970 Valiant. There is a picture of it in BLACK'S LAW DiCrIoNARY
next to the definition of "failure of consideration."
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Even if it has value to the parties themselves, it must also have value
in the eyes of the law.22
M: But why? 23 If it has sufficient commercial value to us, why
should the court second-guess our judgment?
L: It's trying to protect you. It will relieve you of promises for
which you didn't receive a certain kind of value in exchange.
M: Coal companies hardly need protection from themselves.
Nor do most business people, for that matter. 24 So the requirement
of consideration is just a form of paternalism?25
L: Well, not quite. The doctrine of consideration serves sev-
eral policies. 26 For example, consideration serves an evidentiary
function; it provides some evidence that the promise was really
made.27
M: But this contract is in writing. There's no doubt that the
promises were made.
L: Yes, and some civilized societies28 provide that written
promises are binding. Suppose it were oral, though. Suppose you
gave a clock to Barton in exchange for its promises. Then, if Barton
denied the promise, you could say, "Then why does it have my
clock?" It would be some evidence of the promise.29
M: It might be evidence that a promise was made, but we could
lie about the terms just as easily as we could lie about the promise's
existence. Also, Barton could say it was a gift. Anyway, most large
promises have to be in writing, under the Statute of Frauds.30 So
22 WiLLI.AM CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs 147 (4th ed. 1931).
23 At this point, Marchant is about as happy as a nine-lived cat run over by an eight-
een-wheeler.
24 But see Ivan Boesky, Paul Bilzerian, and Michael Milken. Then again, why
shouldn't we let investment bankers sink on their own? It's kind of nice to have at least
one profession be less popular than lawyers, for a change.
25 Cf. the Soviet Union. Sonofagunavitch.
26 Otherwise known as "black letter theory." Students cribbing from this Article
for an upcoming contracts exam, take note.
27 Melvin Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979); see Lon
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941).
28 E.g., the State of Mississippi. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-19-3 (1972). Also, in Mas-
sachussetts a recitation that a writing is sealed makes it a sealed instrument enforceable
without consideration. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 4, § 9A (West 1986). Pennsylvania
law provides that a signed written promise shall not be unenforceable for lack of consid-
eration if the writing contains "an additional express statement, in any form of language,
that the signer intends to be legally bound." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6 (Purdon 1967).
29 Barton could respond with a general denial, which is a legal way of saying to the
court, "Well, who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?" Barton could also
file a demurrer, which derives from the Latin word demorari, meaning "to delay." I am
not making this up.
30 Which may seem pretty obvious, but remember that Marchant isn't a lawyer.
However, she has seen nearly every episode of LA.. Law, and thus already knows how
real lawyers talk and live.
Moreover, the show has taught her other facts about the law, such as the fact that
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the problem exists only for those contracts we are content to en-
force if they are oral. And, it seems to me that the evidentiary pur-
pose is doubtful for another reason.
L: Yes?
M: Most contracts are based on mutual promises. We can't
point-to Barton's "possession" of our promise as evidence of the
contract. We can point to our performance or Barton's as evidence
of the contract, but we can do that whether or not there is consider-
ation. So the evidentiary policy is unpersuasive to me. Does con-
sideration serve any other policies?
L: Yes. It helps exclude from the field cases in which the prom-
isee incurred no significant costs. 1 Since the promisee gives no
consideration, it is not injured.
M: You must be kidding. The promisee is injured if it relies on
the promise. Moreover, if the consideration consists of mutual
promises, the promisee gives up nothing but its own promise-mere
words. It is hurt only if it relies.
L: Well, actually, the law now recognizes a remedy for reli-
ance.32 The remedy usually measures damages according to the
promisee's costs rather than its expectation, but reliance theory can
award expectation damages when justice requires it.s3 However,
consideration also serves another policy: it helps distinguish be-
tween promises and mere expressions of intent.34 This is some-
times called a "channeling function" 35 or an "earmarking" function.
"The populace is made aware that the use of a given device will
attain a desired result."36
M: But any formal requirement would serve that function. Isn't
that so?
L: Well, yes. For example, under Roman law a promisor could
make a promise enforceable by saying the word "spondeo. ' '37 At
trials only last one day, that law firms will turn down a huge client to take a pro bono
case, and that a law firm with seven partners, four associates, and a staff of fifty can still
make enough money to keep everyone rolling in sin. No wonder law school applications
are up.
31 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 3 (discussing "unrelied-upon donative
promises").
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
33 See id.; Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 29, 32.
34 Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 5.
35 Fuller, supra note 27, at 801.
36 J. CAI.AMARI &J. PERILLo, supra note 9, at 294.
37 Latin, for "Cross my heart and hope to die, stick a spatha [spatula] in my eye."
Spondeo had to be said in response to the question, "Do you promise?" Assuming that
this bilingual exchange occurred at Hadrian's wall, it presented a tricky conflict of laws
issue. For discussion ofspondeo under the doctrine ofstipulatio, see Adolf Berger, Encyclo-
pedic Dictionary of Roman Law, 43 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. PHILOS. Soc'y 716 (1953).
1990] 991
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
common law, a promisor could make a written promise enforceable
by placing a wax seal38 on it.39
M: Then the issue is which formality would work best to iden-
tify promises people recognize as binding. On the other hand,
maybe no formality is necessary. People don't generally expect one,
except sometimes a writing. They make the distinction based on the
words used and the factual circumstances. No one doubts that we
intended our written promises to Barton to be real promises, not
just expressions of our future intent. It seems to me that considera-
tion is a clumsy tool for drawing the distinction between real
promises and expressions of intent.40
L: Consideration also serves a cautionary function; it helps in-
sure deliberateness. 4 1 Promises to make gifts are often based on
emotion, surges of gratitude, or impulses of display.42 A donative
promisor tends to look primarily to the promisee's interests rather
than the promisor's own interests, making the promise "more likely
to be uncalculated than deliberative. ' 43
M: I agree that the law should not enforce transactions in-
tended as gifts. However, our contract with Barton was certainly
not intended as a gift. It is a commercial agreement, and our moti-
vation was commercial self-interest, not altruism. It seems odd that
although the transaction was based entirely on self-interest, the law
paternalistically says that we should have looked after our own inter-
est even more-that we should have gotten more out of the deal.
L: You could argue that it comes close to saying that courts
review the adequacy of consideration, which courts insist they don't
do. However, courts would say that they are not reviewing the ade-
quacy, only the existence, of consideration, and that only certain val-
ues qualify as consideration.
M: Why can't contract law distinguish between transactions in-
tended as gifts and commercial contracts clearly not intended as
gifts?
L: Actually, one of the greatest judges in the history of the
common law, Lord Mansfield, held that no consideration should be
38 Or a wax sea lion. The common law was quite flexible.
39 This served evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions. Fuller, supra note
27, at 801.
40 This may be a mixed metaphor, depending on whether the tool is a writing in-
strument. It's not as bad as some mixed metaphors, though, like the one by the ABA
committee which reported that it had "smelled a rat and nipped it in the bud." But then
again, the ABA always has been a bit of a loose cannon in a china shop.
41 Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 5; see Fuller, supra note 27, at 800.
42 Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 5.
43 Id.
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required in a commercial transaction,44 but the House of Lords
overruled him.45
M: Distinguishing gift promises from commercial promises
would distinguish between promises based on altruism and those
based on self-interest, 46 in which parties are more likely self-protect-
ing.47 Why do courts believe that they need to protect coal compa-
nies from making inconsiderate promises in business transactions?
L: The law applies to everyone. It's not so much the coal com-
panies as it is individuals the law seeks to protect here. Another
problem is that in some cases it is difficult to distinguish between
the two types of promises. 48
M: Really? Commercial promises could be defined as promises
related to exchanges. They would not have to be promises actually
given in exchange for value; it would be sufficient that they were
related to exchanges of value. That doesn't seem like an unwork-
able test. Sure there would be hard cases, but there would be easy
cases, too, and at least the law would be asking the right questions.
It would distinguish promises based on self-interest from purely al-
truistic promises. Because altruistic promisors often do not ade-
quately self-protect, the law would protect them and relieve them of
their promises.
L: That's interesting.49
M: Also, the purpose of contract law is, as I understand it, to
protect parties' expectations. Since most people think that commer-
44 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663,97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765) rev'd, Rann v.
Hughes, 7 T.R. 350, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n.a (Ex. 1778). In the same case, he also held
that a written promise required no consideration, but this holding was also overruled in
Rann v. Hughes. Lord Mansfield's other accomplishments include incorporating the law
merchant into the common law, creating the contract law doctrines of constructive con-
ditions and substantial performance, and introducing the Roman law idea of quasi con-
tracts into the common law. J. GALrmAi &J. PERiLLo, supra note 9, at 248 n.2. I bet
that he still wouldn't have gotten tenure, though.
45 Rann v. Hughes. At that time most lords were so narrowminded they could see
through a keyhole with both eyes. They received an education but didn't let it go to
their heads.
46 Self-interest is a powerful motivation, as is evidenced by the recent best-seller,
How to Profit During the Coming Apocalypse.
47 Cf. Melvin Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640, 643
(1982) ("[B]ecause bargain promises are typically rooted in self-interest rather than al-
truism, they are likely to be finely calculated and deliberatively made.").
48 However, this problem, like Wagner's music, is not as bad as it sounds. Cf. bag-
pipe music, which is. Studies have shown that it is virtually impossible to distinguish the
music of a world-class bagpipe band from the sound made by 300 cats and a blowtorch.
Hear also Yoko Ono's music. (The Bluebook apparently left this signal out. It also left
out some other very useful signals, such as read and weep and try to distinguish this one. For
contrary authority, it omitted disregard, ignore also, andfor a really bizarre view, see.).
49 Notice how the dialogue has switched. Now Marchant is the teacher, and Lichten
the student. This shows the power of the Socratic method in a law review article where
it works. But see the law school classroom, where it usually doesn't.
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cial promises are binding and that gift promises are not, the rule
would correspond to people's expectations. What good does it do
for the law to insist on a rule in a geometry book from another uni-
verse, when the reality in our world is quite different?50 Don't
courts care about what actual business practices are, about what
people actually expect?5 1
The story is told of Booker T. Washington, who founded the
Tuskegee Institute. He could have arranged the sidewalks in a geo-
metric pattern and forced students to walk on them. However, he
knew that people take the most convenient routes regardless of
where the sidewalks are. So, after the buildings were built, he
waited until the students established footpaths, and then he built the
sidewalks over the footpaths. It was brilliant.
L: In fact, an empirical study52 has shown that contract law is
often deemed unnecessary by business people. Contracts are bind-
ing because business people adhere to the widely accepted norm
that commitments are to be honored in almost all situations. 53 The
expectations of business people are shaped by that norm.
But perhaps parties' expectations aren't the only value at issue.
Perhaps the state has an interest in enforcing only certain kinds of
promises. For example, the state may believe that the tax-supported
court system should not be used to redress every hurt, but only to
redress "injuries that reach a certain intensity." 54
M: But, as we discussed before,5 5 consideration is a very impre-
50 The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices whichjudges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many cen-
turies, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
51 Learned Americans are still engaged from time to time in valiant efforts
to reduce the common-law rules of contract, and the doctrine of consid-
eration, in particular, to strict logical consistency.... Legal rules exist not
for their own sake, but to further justice and convenience in the business
of human life; dialectic is the servant of their purpose, not their master.
FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT at x (9th ed. 1921).
52 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963). The study compiled lots of data. "Data" is a Latin word meaning
"the plural of anecdote."
53 Id. at 63. However, Professor Walter F. Pratt, Jr. asks, "If business folk are so
agreeable, why is it that I can overload my computer by asking LEXIS to search for
'contract' and 'company or inc.'?" Letter from Walter F. Pratt, Jr. to James D. Gordon
III (Oct. 26, 1989). My response is that he should have the LEXIS service representative
check his terminal for defects.
54 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 3.
55 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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cise way to measure injury. Moreover, it seems to me that the law
already screens out claims involving trivial injuries by awarding only
certain kinds of damages. For example, suppose A and B mutually
promise to meet each other for dinner. The mutual promises are
valid consideration, assuming that each party is bargaining for the
other's presence. However, the law declines to compensate with
damages the slight injury suffered, 56 and so the case is not worth
pursuing.57
L: Perhaps the state has a different interest. Legal economists
justify the doctrine of consideration by arguing that "from an eco-
nomic point of view contracts involving an exchange of values tend
to promote an increase in the public wealth."'58
M: If you want to use a free market analysis to justify considera-
tion, I think you are doomed to failure. Because the doctrine of
consideration does not recognize all the forms of value that private
parties do, it restricts the free market. We voluntarily agreed with
Barton to an unrestricted termination clause because we perceived
that it was in our best commercial interest to do so. There is a mar-
ket for such clauses. However, the doctrine of consideration says
that this form of voluntary private ordering is not recognized by the
law. The law restricts the market by saying that parties cannot make
binding contracts with unrestricted termination clauses, even if they
want to. The doctrine is a paternalistic one, designed to protect
parties against themselves, rather than one which enhances the free
market.
Moreover, promises may facilitate an exchange of values with-
out being given directly in exchange for value. Some promises are
related to exchanges, are ancillary to bargains, 59 but are not them-
selves given in exchange for some identifiable price. These
promises have economic and social utility because they assist ex-
changes and promote economic activity. 60
To change the subject slightly, is there any way that we could
have made our contract with Barton binding?
56 Cf. slander ruining a law professors's reputation, which can usually be pursued in
small claims court.
57 These cases are often handled by informal but effective sanctions. For example,
if you fail to pay your exorcist, he could have you repossessed.
58 C. BUFNOIR, PROPRIETE Er CONTRAT 487 (1900), cited in Eisenberg, supra note 27,
at 4.
59 "Both policy and fairness ... support the enforcement of promises that are ancil-
lary to a bargain and deliberatively made." Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 652.
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 comment b and § 88 comment a
(1979) (option and guaranty contracts in a certain form are binding without considera-
tion, because they are ancillary to bargains and have presumptive utility, and because
option contracts are an appropriate preliminary step in the conclusion of a socially use-
ful transaction).
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L: Yes. You could have placed a restriction on the right of ter-
mination. For example, a requirement that Barton give ten days'
notice before termination would suffice, because then Barton would
be bound for at least ten days. 61
M: That's absurd. We don't care about the ten days. If that's
what we were bargaining for, we wouldn't have bothered to do the
deal. What we wanted was the relationship, the chance to sell a lot
of coal.
L: The contract might have been enforceable if you had simply
deleted the words "without notice" from the termination clause.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to a sale of goods,
such as coal, requires reasonable notification of cancellation unless
the contract provides otherwise. 62 And some courts hold that a re-
quirement to give notice constitutes consideration. 63
M: That's just a fiction of a lawyer's pen.64 We weren't bar-
gaining for notice. But wait a minute. If a restriction on the termi-
nation, clause suffices, what about the covenant of good faith
imposed by the law in every contract?65 Barton in effect covenanted
that it would not terminate for any reason that is in bad faith. That
restricted its options, and therefore it gave consideration. 66
L: Analytically yes. But courts would probably say that this re-
striction is insufficient.
M: I thought that courts decline to review the adequacy of con-
sideration, and will review only whether there is any consideration.
Are you saying that the obligation of good faith is worthless? 67
L: Absolutely not. It was a major step forward in the law, and
the restrictions it places on parties are meaningful. For example
61 Lindner v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 221 Ark. 241, 252 S.W.2d 631
(1952).
62 U.C.C. § 2-309(3) & comment 8 (1978); seeJ. CLAmAm &J. PERiLLO, supra note
9, at 230-31. Section 2-309(3) also provides that "an agreement dispensing with notifi-
cation is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable." However, it is unlikely that
the clause would be held unconscionable in this case, since it was freely agreed on by
two businesses.
63 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 229.
64 But then again, so is Marchant. So why should she complain?
65 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
66 At this point Lichten begins to wonder if Marchant has legal training. To avert
suspicion, the author drinks a glass of water while Marchant is speaking.
67 Now Lichten is getting really suspicious. The author gargles with the water. The
author realizes, for the first time in his life, that "gargle" is an onomatopoeia. Cf. buzz,
zip, snap, crackle, pop, snore, swish, rustle, splash, slosh, shuffle, chop, sputter, plop,
whiz, twang, bang, pound, tweet, gulp, gasp, cough, slush, squeegie, snip, sniff, chug,
burp, snort, retch, shear, shred, motor, whipoorwill, pat, bubble, plunk, trap, tom-tom,
drum, cymbal, tuba, trickle, strum, pluck, spit, rap, puff, pant, ricochet, wheeze, jingle,
whip, tap, whistle, howl, thud, brush, slam, cackle, drip, crisp, snicker, murmur, hiss,
fizz, shriek, whine, crunch, sniffle, fizzle, rip, rattle, clang, flutter, roar, snarl, whack,
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under the Uniform Commercial Code good faith is defined as "hon-
esty in fact." 68 For merchants the UCC defines it as "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade." 69 The Restatement defines it as "faithfulness to
an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified ex-
pectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of con-
duct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. 70
M: So Barton could not terminate for the purpose of running
us out of business or other bad faith reasons, could it?
L: No. However, I doubt that the requirement of good faith
is a sufficient restriction to constitute consideration in these
circumstances.
M: How much of a restriction on a party's options is required
to constitute consideration?
L: Sometimes not very much. For example, A's promise that it
will lease a ship to B if A buys the ship constitutes consideration. 71
This is called a conditional promise, and it is sufficient consideration
even though A has complete control over the condition. Although A
can walk away from the deal by not buying the ship, he has limited
his options: he cannot buy the ship and decline to lease it to B.
That is enough of a limitation to constitute consideration.
M: Distinguishing the good faith case from the ship and notice
cases doesn't make much sense to me.
L: I doubt that much of the law in this area makes sense to
business people. For example, even without a termination clause,
your contract with Barton was unenforceable at common law. The
old common law considered Barton's promise to buy all the coal it
"required" from you to be illusory because Barton might refrain
from requiring anything.7 2 However, the UCC, which tried to make
the law correspond more closely to business practices,73 recognized
that requirements contracts serve a useful commercial purpose, and
so it made them enforceable.7 4 It provides that a term which meas-
scratch, click, clap, sip, flap, screech, squeal, smack, grunt, groan, mumble, whimper,
rumble, thunder, creak, crinkle, sizzle, clatter, and smooch.
The ultimate onomatopoeia is "barbarian," which is based on the sound that
Greeks thought foreigners made when they talked.
The author regrets that when he graduated from college the market for English
teachers was a bust.
68 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978).
69 Id. § 2-103(I)(b).
70 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1979).
71 Scott v. Moragues Lumber Co., 202 Ala. 312, 80 So. 394 (1918).
72 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 240.
73 Thereby marching the law headlong into the 20th Century.
74 U.C.C. § 2-306 (1978).
1990] 997
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of
the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in
good faith. 75
M: Ah! So the good faith limitation can be sufficient.
L: In this context, yes. 76 Courts have also reasoned that con-
sideration can be found in the buyer's surrender of the privilege of
purchasing elsewhere. 77
Let's change the subject again and look at the modification you
want to make in your contract. You will probably be shocked to
hear this, but under the common law the modification is unenforce-
able for lack of consideration. Because you give nothing to Barton
in exchange for its promise to pay you the extra money, the modifi-
cation is not binding. Under the "legal duty rule," your promise to
supply coal to Barton is not consideration for Barton's new promise,
because you already had a legal duty to do that.78
M: I really am shocked. Business people modify agreements all
the time, and they expect the modifications to be binding.
L: The UCC recognizes that fact for goods contracts. It pro-
vides that "[a]n agreement modifying a contract needs ... no con-
sideration to be binding." 79 It tries to avoid extortionate situations
by requiring that the modification be made in good faith.80 The
Second Restatement of Contracts also recognizes that some modifi-
cations are binding without consideration, but it is narrower than
the UCC.1 While your modification, if made in good faith, is bind-
75 Id.
76 For a discussion of other contexts in which courts have held that a requirement
of good faith or reasonableness avoids the illusory promise problem, seeJ. CAL.m m &
J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 228. See also U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1979) (an exclusive dealing
contract imposes an obligation on the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and
on the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale).
A well known case is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917), in which defendant gave plaintiff the exclusive right to sell her clothing designs
and endorsements in exchange for his promise to pay her one-half of the revenues.
Plaintiff did not expressly bind himself to make any efforts. However, Judge Cardozo
found an implied promise to use reasonable efforts, on the assumption that the parties
did not intend that plaintiff would simply sit around on his Duff-Gordon. Any relation-
ship between Lady Duff-Gordon and me is unlikely, since at that time my ancestors had
no sense of clothing fashion. My students say that this trait is obviously genetic.
77 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 240.
78 See generally BJ. Reiter, Courts, Consideration, and Common Sense, 27 U. TORONTO L.J.
439 (1977).
79 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978).
80 Id. comment 2.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1979) provides:
Modification of Executory Contract.
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on
either side is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or
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ing because the UCC applies to your contract, it would not be bind-
ing under the Restatement if the rise in market price were
anticipated.
M: But what if we simply tore up the old contract and signed a
new one with the new price?
L: That would be enforceable under the common law.8 2 The
rescinding agreement has consideration because each party relin-
quishes its executory rights under the old contract. 83 And the new
promises are consideration for each other.
M: Both transactions accomplish precisely the same result. The
only difference is that in the second case the parties go through a
special ceremony. The law might as well have the parties utter a
mystical incantation.
L: The second case satisfies the doctrine of consideration,
whereas the first case does not.
M: It's a victory of conceptualism over functionalism. And, if
you ask me, it shows that the conceptual framework is defective.
Contractual modifications are promises related to exchanges.8 4 The
motives of the parties are primarily economic, not sentimental. 85
L: The first time the House of Lords addressed the question of
modifications was in the 1884 case of Foakes v. Beer.86 Dr. Foakes
owed Mrs. Beer a sum of money on a judgment. She promised to
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material
change of position in reliance on the promise.
82 See Reiter, supra note 78, at 492.
83 I&
84 Contractual modifications are ancillary to exchanges and are "going-transaction
adjustments." Fuller, supra note 27, at 818 (quoting Llewellyn). They are related to
bargains, and keep the process flexible and serviceable. C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 36
(interpreting JOHN DAWSON, Givrs AND PROMISES (1980)).
Enforcing voluntary modifications supports the policy of freedom of con-
tract and facilitates economic growth. Contracting parties often desire to
alter their agreements in response to changes in circumstances or of
mind. Because people are free to contract on whatever terms they
choose, logically they should also be free to alter their contracts however
they choose. Rules that preclude adjustment of contract terms in spite of
parties' desires to change their agreements could discourage some from
entering into contractual relationships. In view of the frequency of con-
tract alteration, such laws also could impede rather than facilitate actual
commercial practices.
Robert Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 680, 681 (1982).
85 Cf. Fuller, supra note 27, at 817 ("We may define exchange.., as a transaction in
which the motives of the parties are primarily economic rather than sentimental.").
86 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884). This classic case will be remembered as long as first-
year law students are required to study it. The case is included in casebooks because it is
a useful one for professors who have a blackbelt in the Socratic method. The Socratic
method is the reason that law school is the only place where you learn to hate your own
name.
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forgive the interest on the debt if he would pay part of the principal
then and the rest in later installments. The House of Lords held
that her promise to forgive the interest was unenforceable because
she received no consideration for it.87
M: But people enter into these kinds of agreements all the time
and consider them binding.
L: In fact, one lord noted precisely that.88 He wrote that busi-
ness people recognize that prompt payment of part of a debt may be
more beneficial to them than to insist on their rights and try to col-
lect the whole sum by executing on the debt. 9
M: Absolutely. Executing on debts is a hassle; it's expensive,
time-consuming, and uncertain. Furthermore, it might push the
debtor into bankruptcy, in which case the creditor could get less
than under the compromise.
L: But the House of Lords held that the promise was not en-
forceable for want of consideration. 90 Although the agreement
might have had immense practical value to the creditor, it did not
have value as a theoretical matter, since the creditor was already en-
titled to the full amount and thus theoretically received no fresh
advantage. 91
One lord wrote that it would have been wiser had lower courts
resolved the matter differently in the past.92 However, because of
stare decisis, 93 he thought that it was not within the province of the
House of Lords to overturn it. 94 The law had been settled since
1602, and it would have upset expectations to change it.95
M: This is crazy. It was recognized in 1884 that business peo-
ple still entered into these agreements. Even now, after nearly four
hundred years of the legal duty rule, people still almost unani-
mously believe that contractual modifications are binding. Chang-
ing the rule would protect people's expectations, not upset them.
87 Show me a person who finds this case fascinating, and I'll show you the charisma
coach for Calvin Coolidge.
88 It was a moment of definite interest, nearly approaching excitement.
89 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884) (Lord Blackburn, concurring).
90 This was apparently the result of chromosome damage caused by generations of
inbreeding among the aristocracy, which had a debilitating effect on rational thought.
The lords would meet in Parliament daily for the sole purpose of participating in the
rearrangement of ignorance.
91 This is the kind of argument that gives lunacy a bad name.
92 However, he recognized that wisdom is not all it's cracked up to be.
93 Latin, for "We stand by our past mistakes." Seventy percent of all legal reason-
ing is the logical fallacy of appeal to authority. The other forty percent is simply mathe-
matical errors.
94 This argument is to logic as mud wrestling is to the performing arts.
95 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884) (Lord Fitzgerald, concurring).
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L: The case has been widely criticized, 96 but as Justice Holmes
observed, in the law "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."'97
M: In fact, the whole doctrine of consideration involves a re-
markable irony. Contract law is designed to protect people's expec-
tations. But after centuries of the doctrine of consideration, people
still basically believe that commercial promises are binding and that
gifts are not. That's what their expectations are. They are abso-
lutely stunned when their lawyers9" tell them that an unrestricted
termination clause makes a contract completely unenforceable and
that the law does not recognize many contractual modifications. It
is a terrible indictment of the doctrine of consideration that the
business community has never accepted it, or at least has largely
ignored it.99 It's not that the doctrine is an anachronism, which
would be bad enough; it's that it has never been accepted by the
business community since the beginning. 10 0
You mentioned that the UCC recognizes commercial reality by
enforcing contractual modifications. Does the law enforce other
promises without consideration?
L: Yes. Examples include' 0 ' certain option contracts; 10 2 cer-
tain guarantee contracts; 103 promises to waive nonmaterial condi-
tions;10 4 promises to pay a prior indebtedness which was
unenforceable because of the statute of limitations, 0 5 the prom-
isor's minority, 10 6 or bankruptcy; 10 7 certain promises made in rec-
ognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor; l08
96 See C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 141 n.23.
97 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
98 Most lawyers can be stunning-except, of course, tax lawyers. A tax lawyer is a
person who is good with numbers but who does not have enough personality to be an
accountant.
99 Cf. Macaulay, supra note 52 (study showing that contract law is largely though not
entirely irrelevant in most business dealings).
100 Cf. Macauley, supra note 14, at 466 ("[A]cademic contract law is not now and
never was a descriptively accurate reflection of the institution in operation.").
101 Please hold your applause until the end.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(a) (1979).
103 Id. § 88(a).
104 Id. § 84; Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908). In Clark v. West a pub-
lisher promised to pay an author for writing a law book. The publisher conditioned its
payment of an extra $4 per page on the author's abstention from intoxicating liquors
during the contract. The company's object was presumably to avoid receiving a book
which looked like the product of three martinis and a dictaphone. The court held that
the company's later promise to pay the extra money despite the author's consumption of
alcohol was enforceable without consideration because it was a waiver of a nonmaterial
condition. The book is quite good. Really. It even comes with a cocktail napkin you can
use as a bookmark.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 82 (1979).
106 Id. § 85.
107 Id. § 83.
108 Id. § 86.
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stipulations regarding pending judicial proceedings; 0 9 and firm of-
fers by merchants, 0 10 written waivers of claims, and certain nego-
tiable instruments under the UCC.112
These promises are enforceable because they serve a socially
useful purpose, are ancillary to bargains, or are justified by notions
of unjust enrichment, morality, fairness, or commercial practice. Of
course, the largest categories of promises binding without consider-
ation are those made enforceable through the doctrines of reli-
ance' 13 or restitution. 1 4
M: Those examples show that the doctrine of consideration is
too narrow. Consideration is not the only social or commercial jus-
tification for enforcing promises." 5
I just have one final question. When parties give mutual
promises, how is that consideration?
L: That is, quite frankly, an unsolved mystery. Under the doc-
trine of consideration, A 's promise is enforceable only if A gets
something of value in return. Suppose what A gets in return is B's
promise. B s promise has value only if it's enforceable, which takes
us back to where we began. The analysis is completely circular." 6
The rule that mutual promises constitute consideration for each
other has been described as "one of the secret paradoxes of the
Common Law."117
109 Id. § 94.
110 U.C.C. § 2-205 (1978).
I1 Id. § 1-107.
112 Id. § 3-408.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
114 Id. §§ 370-77.
115 Professor Charles L. Knapp has hypothesized that, if current trends in contract
law continue, unchecked by countertrends, the Restatement of Contracts in the year
2000 might provide something like this:
§ 1. Promises Enforceable
Every promise made apparently with serious intention to perform is en-
forceable by any person forseeably injured by its unjustified
nonperformance.
Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future-And Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamor-
phosis of Contract Law, 82 MicH. L. REv. 932, 938 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNS-
wORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)).
116 LON FULLER & MELVIN EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 81 (4th ed. 1981). On
the other hand, perhaps it merely rests on the incontrovertible mathematical formula
that 0 + 0 = 2.
117 Frederick Pollock, Book Review, 30 L.Q. REv. 128, 129 (1914) (reviewing J.G.
PEASE & A.M. LuTrER, THE STUDENT's SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (2d ed.
1913)). Regarding wholly executory contracts consisting of mutual promises, Lon L.
Fuller wrote:
There is here no unjust enrichment. Reliance may or may not exist, but
in any event will not be so tangible and direct as where it consists in the
rendition of the price of the defendant's performance. On the side of
form, we have lost the natural formality involved in the turning over of
property or the rendition and acceptance of services. There remains sim-
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M: Do you mean to tell me that consideration theory cannot
even explain why the most common type of contract is enforceable?
It hardly seems a theory worth saving.
L: Perhaps not, but do you have something better?
M: I'll try. First, I would preserve the doctrines of reliance and
restitution. With respect to the doctrine of consideration, however,
the law could do much better.
Since contract law is designed to protect parties' expectations,
the law should first look at the basic expectations of business people
and others who enter into contracts.118 People generally consider
commercial contracts to be binding-particularly written ones, but
not exclusively so. Because they consider commercial promises
binding, they are likely to rely on them, sometimes in ways that are
difficult to measure, and to be injured if the promise is breached.
They are also likely to fix their expectations based on their belief
that these agreements are binding. On the other hand, people rec-
ognize that gift promises are often not kept, and their expectations
generally take this fact into account." 9
When I say commercial promises, I mean promises related to
an exchange of values. They need not be given directly in exchange
for a particular price; it is sufficient that they are related to an ex-
change. 120 It is true that some promises are difficult to categorize as
commercial promises or gifts. However, most promises are not dif-
ficult to categorize at all. Promises relating to the business opera-
tions of either party are generally commercial promises. Everyone
expects them to be binding. Promises between individuals with
other relationships, such as family relationships or friendship, can
ply the fact that the transaction is an exchange and not a gift. This fact
alone does offer some guaranty so far as the cautionary and channeling
functions of form are concerned, though, except as the Statute of Frauds
interposes to supply the deficiency, evidentiary safeguards are largely
lacking.
Fuller, supra note 27, at 816-17.
118 [This theory's] basis is ... utilitarian; the necessity in a commercial civili-
zation that sensible expectations induced by a promisor be not too often
defeated. Business calculations assume inevitably the dependability of
undertakings about future conduct.... Hence the test for the existence
of a promise would depend on whether words or conduct should be ex-
pected to create a sense of practical dependability in another's mind.
... [T]he theory of dependable expectations, with its correlative test,
is the theory which may be expected to control the development, in a
civilization like ours, of contract law.
Malcolm Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 784-85 (1941).
119 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 3 & n.7, 5.
120 Professors Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson analyzed more than 200 re-
cent promissory estoppel cases and concluded that the emerging new rule is that any
promise made in furtherance of an economic activity is enforceable. Daniel A. Farber &
John A. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppe: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake",
52 U. Gui. L. REv. 903, 904-05 (1985).
1990] 1003
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
sometimes be more difficult to classify. In these cases as well, how-
ever, the law should examine whether the promise is related to an
intended exchange of values. While there are close cases, there are
also paradigms, and in my judgment the distinction would be a
workable one.
While expectations are sometimes shaped by legal rules, in this
area the legal rules have failed to shape the market's expectations
after four hundred years, even though many of the actors in the
market are very sophisticated. If the rules have shaped expecta-
tions, they have done so only to the extent of the general categories
I mentioned--distinguishing between commercial promises and
gifts. Therefore, it seems pointless to continue the charade.
L: What about the functions served by consideration?
M: The commercial-gift dichotomy serves the cautionary func-
tion better than does the doctrine of consideration. It distinguishes
between transactions based on self-interest, in which the promisor
can be presumed to self-protect, and transactions based on altruism,
in which the promisor is thinking more about the donee's interests
than his own. In altruistic transactions the law can protect the
promisor's interests for him. The test asks directly whether a prom-
ise is intended as a commercial promise or a gift. The doctrine of
consideration tries to make the same inquiry, but it asks the ques-
tion in a narrow, wooden fashion. 121 The result is that many clearly
commercial promises are unenforceable. The law has attempted to
rectify this underinclusivity by enforcing some promises without
consideration, either through statute or by making common law ex-
ceptions to the doctrine of consideration.
The test also satisfies the channeling function better than does
consideration because it better corresponds to people's expecta-
tions about which promises are binding. People commonly under-
stand that commercial promises are serious business and are
normally binding commitments. 122 The doctrine of consideration
relieves people of promises that they expected to be binding and is
therefore underinclusive, to the injury of promisees.
The test does not satisfy the evidentiary function, but that func-
121 A revised rule of promissory obligation should accept the fundamental
fact that commitments are often made to promote economic activity and
obtain economic benefits without any specific bargained-for exchange.
Promisors expect various benefits to flow from their promise-making. A
rule that gives force to this expectation simply reinforces the traditional
free-will basis of promissory liability, albeit in an expanded context of
relational and institutional interdependence.
Id. at 929.
122 "Requiring an exchange increases the chance that the parties had in contempla-
tion serious business with serious consequences." C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 38 (inter-
preting Fuller, supra note 27).
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tion is only randomly served by the doctrine of consideration any-
way. The Statute of Frauds is a more logical approach, and if more
evidentiary security is deemed necessary, the Statute could be
amended to cover all large promises.
L: What about economic theory?
M: The commercial-gift dichotomy corresponds better to eco-
nomic theory than does consideration. Commercial promises facili-
tate economic exchange, and therefore should be enforceable. This
argument might prove too much, since some gifts (especially from
wealthier donors to poorer donees) could also stimulate economic
activity.' 23 However, this effect is more speculative and remote for
gifts than for exchanges, and the expectation, cautionary, and chan-
neling arguments justify the law's general refusal to enforce gifts.
Moreover, the doctrine of consideration restricts the market be-
cause it substitutes its own judgment about what is valuable for the
market's judgment. It refuses to recognize some values that people
truly bargain for. It therefore fails to respect private autonomy124
and the voluntary private ordering of the market. If a market has
been created for the terms of an exchange, so long as it is a real
exchange and not a pretense,125 a court should not substitute its
judgment about what is valuable and what is not. 126 Of course, val-
ues which are simply inherent in gifts, such as the donor's personal
satisfaction in giving the gift or seeing that the donee receives it, or
an increase in the donor's stature, cannot count, since they would
make all gifts enforceable. But other values which promisors genu-
inely consider sufficient should be recognized.
The law-can protect persons who do not act voluntarily or
knowingly by looking specifically at those issues and by providing
additional protections for consumers, if necessary. However, the
doctrine of consideration irrebuttably presumes that no one know-
ingly enters into a contract unless he or she receives in return what
the court perceives to be valuable. As the market has shown for
centuries, this assumption is simply incorrect.
The commercial-gift dichotomy would better protect real ex-
123 "[G]ifts have a wealth-redistribution effect, and taken as a class probably redis-
tribute wealth to persons who have more utility for the money than the donors-a phe-
nomenon that certainly affects the composition, and may affect the extent, of aggregate
demand." Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 4.
124 See Fuller, supra note 27, at 806-10. "[The rule that the law will not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration] affirms the liberal principle that the free arrangements of
rational persons should be respected." C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 35.
125 "When the law says that there must be an exchange, it means just that and not a
charade pretending to be an exchange." C. FRIED, supra note 15, at 30.
126 "The goodness of the exchange is for the parties alone to judge-the law is con-
cerned only that there be an exchange." Id. at 29 (emphasis in original).
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pectations, better satisfy the cautionary and channeling functions,
and better correspond to economic theory than does the doctrine of
consideration. It would even explain why mutual promises are en-
forceable: they relate to and facilitate an exchange of values. For all
these reasons, this test would much better serve the law of consen-
sual private obligations than does the moribund doctrine of
consideration.
L: Benjamin Cardozo observed that the time has come "when
the old forms seem ready to decay, and the old rules of action have
lost their binding force."' 2 7 Perhaps someday contract law will
more closely reflect common sense and modem commercial prac-
tice,' 28 and business people will not have to seek legal advice reflect-
ing irrational rules from centuries long past. 129
127 Benjamin Cardozo, The Altruist in Politics, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NA-
THAN CARDOZO 47, 47 (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947).
128 [I]t is to be expected that business pressure will result in [the] modifica-
tion and simplification [of the rules of consideration]. For they often ap-
pear to result in waste effort at all stages of legal activity-draftsmanship,
counselling, litigation, and scholarship. Perhaps more important, here as
elsewhere in the law, what might be the legitimate authority of a rational
profession is impaired by the presence of rules and practices for which
the layman may well have little respect.
Sharp, supra note 118, at 795.
129 But between now and then, there's a couple of quick bucks to be made by
lawyers.
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